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Abstract
Tias paper respcmds co Jaegwon Kun's powerful objecturn co the very pos-
stbday of genuznely novel emergent properues Ktm amues diat the mco-
herence of reflenve downward causation means that the causal power of
an emeigent phenomenon is ultzmately reduable to the causal powers of
tts constituents 1 offer a ~pie argument showmg how co diaractenze
emergent propertzes m terms of the effects of structural relatzons an the
causal powers of that. constauents
I
Despite undergomg somethmg of a revival m recent years, `emer-
gence' is a concept that continues to ellen a strongly cntical reacnon
from certam philosophical quarters Though it has a vanety of re -
spectable uses in the natural saences, reference to emergence In the
philosophy of mmd evokes visions of vvdd speculanve metaphysics
and an abandonment of ontological parsimony Given its checkered
lustory, rim response is understandable 1 And yet, a suitably-crafted
concept of emergence could play a useful role m contemporary meta-
physics with respect to the problem of epiphenomenalism for higher-
levei propernes Unhke traditional functionahst approaches to this
issue, emergence promises to provide the conceptual framework nec-
essary for understandmg the related notions of causality, explananon
and mdivaluation such that we can avoid rendering everythmg above
the levei of our microphysics epiphenomenal
Emergennsts have tradinonally sought ways of reconalmg com-
monsense matenalism with our ordmary assumpnons about the kmds
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of thmgs that exist By commonsense matenahsm I mean the scien-
nfically-mformed behef that the thmgs we encounter In our daily
hves are constituted of matter and energy This aspect of the scien-
tific worldview is often seen as clashmg with our behef m the reality
of the objects of everyday lie Are there really mountams, teacups,
trees and people or is there nothing but "atoms m the void” Virtu-
ally ali naturalistically-inchned thmkers (emergentists mcluded) will
accept that everythmg m the natural world is constnuted of matter
and energy that is denved from the ongmal moment of the formation
of the urnverse
However, even given these physicahst assumpnons, there is a di-
ference, as Lynne Rudder-Baker and others have noted, between
what somethmg is made of and what it is (Rudder-Baker 1993) This
distinction between constitution and Identity is especially significara
m the case of people Ordmanly, a person's name is taken to refer
to somethmg that is irreducible to the state of the physical stuff that
constantes a particular body at a particular time The problem of de -
termining a meamngful sense m which you can be said to differ from
or are more than your constituents lias a long history In the past
thirty years, considerable effort lias been devoted to understandmg
the difference between constttunon and Identity m functional terms,
and yet the functionalist half-way house between physicalism and
dualism faces a set of well-known problems 2 Emergence, by contrast
is a relatively unexplored way to understand the difference between
constam-10n and Identity from withm a naturalistic framework
Understandmg what it means to say that mmds are real and that
reference to concepts hke behef and desire has real explanatory value,
requires that we develop a proper understandmg of how to make
room for the causal powers of mental ennnes In a physical world
Given the causal completeness of physics and the non-reducibility of
mental propernes, the power of mmds to make a causal difference
m the world is a tricky metaphysical problem mdeed Many pluloso-
phers view functionaltst or supetvement charactenzations of mental
propernes as the proper modern response to the problem of mental
causation and to the kmds of concerns that monvated the old Bnush
Emergennst tradition Functionahsts leginnme statements mvolv-
mg mental enteies by reference to the explanatory mdispensabihty of
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those enraies m the special sciences However, an argument for ex-
planatory indispensability is not the same as an argument for the real-
ity of an ennty As Dretske (1988) and others have noted, given the
usual physicahst ontological assumptions, tt is difficult to justify more
than an epiphenomenal role to thmgs we mdtviduate functionally
Hence, functions have httle ontological weight and hard-nosed re-
ductionists can easily argue that while they might be good for certam
explanatory or pragmattc purposes, they will not be counted when we
catalog the ontological fumiture of the natural world
The first obstacle to argumg for the reality of higher-level phe-
nomena is the suspicion that the threat of epiphenomenalism is a fake
problem This suspicion monvates Rudder-Baker's (1993) pragmanc
response to the problem of mental causation She advises droppmg
our metaphysical commitment to the causal closure of the phystcal
world m order to save talk of persons (2000) Her argument derives
from pragmatic considerations and as such, it is obwously sound It
would be ummagmably difficult to abandon our behef in people for
the sake of our metaphysical scruples But perhaps rather than simply
dismissing the problem for pragmanc purposes, we can understand
the mstrumental value of our behef m higher-level phenomena as
pomtmg to an alternative metaphysical pacture In contrast with the
strategy of pragmatic avoidance, I take the concept of emergence as
providing a way to recast our basic metaphysical assumpttons so as to
account for the usefulness of higher-level phenomena
The problem of understandmg the relanonship between the in-
strumental success of our behef m higher-level phenomena and the
truthfulness of those behefs is especially important with respect to the
status of psychological explanation It is generally assumed that the
legitunacy of psychological explanation depends, at least In part, on
its ability to uncover distinctively psychological kmds of causes 'The
trouble for psychological explananon is that standard, non-reduc-
tive matenalist views of mental hfe seem unable to differentiate be-
tween the causal power of mental events qua mental events and the
causal power of the microphysical phenomena that realize or embody
them Our alleged inability to differennate between what minds do
and what their physical constituents do becomes a problem for non-
reductive matenahsts given orthodox views of what it is that makes
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somethmg real If neurons, rather than mmds are domg ali the work,
can we really say that mmds existi For the generahzations of psy-
chology to have more than a merely epiphenomenal gni) on reahty,
proponents of non-reductive matenalism must be able to pomt to a
causally relevant role for mental propernes
Whde there are some philosophers who happdy advocate ehrm-
nanvism with respect to mental Life, the Klea that the mental prop-
entes of an agent will not figure In a germine explananon of her be-
havior is unacceptable to most non-reductrve matenalists Never-
theless, the crucial problem for ali non-reducttve matenahsts is to
understand what it means to say that higher-level phenomena (hke
people) act on their constituents ui such a way as to distmguish the
causal power of the lugher-level phenomena from the causal power of
its constituents As previously mentioned, one promment response
to the problem is to treat higher-levei phenomena as superventent In
essence, advocates of supervemence ciam that the propernes char-
actenzing the Identity of a superventng phenomenon exist only be-
cause of the underlytng, or `subiacene properties of its constttuents
On this view, the causal propernes of the constituents can account
ennrely for the causal propernes of the supenrening phenomenon
For something to count as real, it must have a uruque causal role to
play m the natural world A property that supervenes on the proper-
nes of its constttuents cannot, by defitutton, have such a role Hence,
supervemence is basically a derual of the reahty of lugher-level phe-
nomena This is simply because, m these debates, reahty is connected
to the notion of causal power
At first glance, contrary to advocates of supervemence, It seems
obvious that complex systems like hurricanes, orgamsms and cp.-
demics have thew own distinctive set of powers As it dtgests its dm-
nez for example, an orgarusm seems to exert a distinctively biological
kind of causal power over Its newly absorbed constituents And yet,
the commonsense vtew that new thmgs can exhtbit new powers faces
a metaphysical objection remuuscent of Ecclestastes' pessimisttc pro-
nouncement that 'there is nothmg new under the sun Is there a
thmg of which it is said, "See this is new" ? It has already been in
the ages before us' (1 9-10) The fate of the food as it undergoes
digestion, accordmg to the modern Ecclesiastes, can be explamed
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entirely in tenns of a set of chemical reactions, and these in tum can,
at least in principie, be explamed ennrely in terms of the behavior
of the atoms m the molecules of our food and our digestive juices
at the quantum levei Ultimately, there is no need to look for any
ontological content to our talk of orgamsms and digestton, let alone
hunge4 kitchens and the pleasure of a good meal For emergentists,
by contrast an orgamsm would be a good example of the kmd of thmg
which manages to act on its own constnuents m a way that can be
distmguished from the behavior of those constauents
However, while it certamly seems natural to assume that higher-
levei phenomena hke orgarusms exhibit their own novel land of
power m the world, on reflection, the land of downward causation
imphot in examples of emergence can seem hke a bizarre metaphys-
icai exercise Can sometlung hke an orgarusm really
act on its constnuents 7 Wouldn't das require that m actmg on
constauents, the emergent property is changmg the very thmgs that
make ti what it is ? If so, then wouldn't the Identity of the orgarnsm be
changmg in such a way as to make it unpossible to say that ti is acttng
on Taken in its smctest sense, ti looks hke the idea of a system
acnng on lts own constituents reduces to absurdny The apparent
contradiction that seems imphcit m such cases leads jaegwon Kim to
conclude that the putanve causal powers of lugher-level propernes
are always causally preempted by the propernes of ther underlymg
phystcal constauents Kim and others argue that, while we can cer-
tainly Identity new pattems and phenomena for mstrumental or other
reasons, these can only be shown to be 'real' or, to constaute a 'nat-
ural land', given the identification of a muque set of causal powers
Consequently, a non-trivial model of downward causation can make
sense only if we gtve tt a conceptual attetpretation "'That is, we in-
terpret the hierarchical leveis as leveis of concepts and descnptions,
or leveis withm our representational apparatus, rather than leveis
of properties and phenomena m the world " (Kim 1999, 33) 'The
present paper responds to Kim's cnticism of reflexive downward cau-
sation and In so domg attempts to make the case that higher-level




To begm with, the case for a realistic form of emergence is blocked by
metaphystcal principies govermng recent debates m philosophy, es-
pecially m the philosophy of mmd The problem of determmmg the
causal powers of lugher-level phenomena is generated by two well-
entrenched metaphysical assumpnons shared by virtually ali mate-
nahsts The first is the ciam that ali non-basic propernes strongly
supervene on their physical constituents, the second is that the phys-
ical world is causally closed enven the causal closure principie, it
impossible to imagine causal powers that are not already exhausnvely
captured by the basic physical constituents of the natural world In
part, this is because such powers (ugher-level or otherwise) would
enter int° intolerable causal compention with their physical con-
steuents
So, how should emergennsts proceed m the face of the preemp-
non argument? At present there are two principal strateges In the
hterature, each of which has an important place m the emergen-
tist arsenal First, an argument agamst preemption from pragmattc
considerations and second a cnticism of the physicalist's unrealistic
physics While both hnes of cnticism are reasonable, they fail to
respond to the central problem A third more basic conceptual argu-
ment is needed to seal the case for a behevable form of emergennsm
Tius durd argument must make clear sense of the most paradoxical
commitment of traditional emergentism, namely the behef mn what
Kirn has called "synchromc refiexive downward causation" 3
Begmnmg with the pragmatic argument, in the first place an-
tes hke Rudder-Baker and others correctiy note that the preernption
argument, along with the minimahst ontology it imposes, draws its
force from the idea that causal power talk makes sense as a way of
mclividuatmg properties and objects Smce, there is no clear agree
ment on the nature of causation and given the difficulty of gettun
clear on the notton of cause, many philosophers have chosen to sim-
ply avoid the murky question enttrely For example, ui bis recent
chscussions of emergence Robert Batterman has simply demed that
natural kmds talk makes sense (Batterman, 2000) While I am sym-
pathenc to Batterman's frustration with the metaphysical argument
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concerning causal powers and natural kmds, his way of dismissing
the preempnon argument, by salesteppmg the core conceptual issue,
does not sattsfy the traditional emergentist demand for a way of le-
gitimizing emergent phenomena as real, as opposed to merely mstru-
mentally converuent
There are a vanety of pragmatic strategies for connnuing to talk
about higher-level phenomena, each of which is unsansfying to emer-
gennsts In the long run for similar reasons For mstance, one could
admit that causanon and scientific explanation are intimately con-
nected but reverse the traditional order of their relanonship Along
these tines, Rudder-I3aker has argued that, in practice, our expia-
nations are not leginmized by their relanonslup to some underlymg
causal structure Instead, she argues, our nonon of cause denves its
legitimacy from our explanatory practices For Rudder-Baker, good
explanations lead us to assert the presence of causes and the reality
of certam kmds of objects, not vice versa (2000)
Rather than talang the pragmatic way out of the metaphysical
problem, emergennsts may undertake a second more general critique
of the premises that force us into the impasse In the first place This
second strategy for avading preempnon argues that an mappropn-
ately fundamentahst picture of physics supports the preempnon ar-
gument Most scientists would agree, for example, that the picture of
physics implica in the work of most physicalist philosophers of mmd
is hopelessly unrealistic In terms of ontology, for example, the pre-
emptor's metaphysics is supported by the icica of a mechamcal uni-
verse where smaller things combine In mechamcal relanons to pro-
duce 'Inger thmgs It is well known that the reductive relationship
between pares and whole runs up against a number of problematic
phenomena in physics Take, for example, cases where new entales
emerge via fusion For Paul Humphreys, the physical phenomenon of
fusion provides an obvious example of emergence Here, the bearers
of two distinct propernes combine by fusion to generate a third entity
whose propernes cannot be said to supervene on the properttes of its
constauents
In the case of fusion, the crucial pomt for the discussion of emer-
gence is whether the emergent entity can be sauí to supervene over
its constauents m the way that functionalists beheve functional con-
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cepts supervene on physical stnictures As Humphreys argues, fusion
is clearly not a matter of a functional or a supervement relanonslup
between the consteuents and their fused product Emergence via
fusion Iffers from a functional relationship between leveis of expia-
nation In the followmg way In the case of a superveruence relatton,
propernes can be sal(' to supervene on thetr structural constituents
wtthout elimmating or competmg with the underlymg material struc-
ture A classtc example might be for example, the aesthetic propemes
of a work of art By contrast, the relationship between the emergent
phenomenon and us constituents m the case of fuston takes a differ-
ent form There, the emergent product appears only after the umon
and Isappearance of the constttuents 4 'The notion that the bear-
ers of properttes can fuse, thereby gtvmg nse to a new product with
new pmpernes has a vanety of applications m physics Nuclear fu-
ston and the like would be the obvious example 5 Though nuclear
fuston is a very spectfic case, one could generalize the Klea of a fusion
of properttes to other contexts
In crafttng the preemption argument, philosophers of mtnd clearly
assume a great deal about the ontology of physics Their basic as-
sumptton is that the account of elementary !nades and fields pro-
vided by the standard model supports reductionism As it happens,
physicists are deeply ambivalent about the status of reducnorusm In
their work We should note for example that the reductionist mtu-
mon that Inger thtngs are nothirtg more than the sum of their parts
ali the way down is wolated conststently m modern formulations of
quantum field theory From the mability of the standard model to
successfiilly reduce hadrons to quarks and gluons to the pluralist on-
tology of effective field theory, modem physics is not a comfortable
place for reductionists
Arguably, the vtew of phystcs supportmg th.e anu- emergenust po-
smon is based on a quesnonable conception of physical law, expia-
nanon and ontology 6 Once the phystcahst's picture of physics is
revised, then the emergence debate will Look somewhat dtfferent
Howeveç even given an updated picture of physics, there remams
a major conceptual problem blocking talk of lugher-level phenom-
ena This problem will serve as the focus for the remainder of thts
paper
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It is generally acicnowledged that m order to defend the genume
causal power and thereby the reality of emergent phenomena re-
gimes the articulation of a meanmgful sense In which they can be
said to exlubit downward causation Downward causanon is a shp-
pery nonon, since there is a sense m which downward causation fol-
lows as a corollary to any ascnptton of a causal relata:ui above the
levei of our basic physics As we shall see below, the real difficulty is
not so much m demonstratmg that our causal clauns com= us to
downward causation — that tuins out to be trivial, especially given
a model of propernes whtch strongly supervene on one their con-
stituents Rather, the trouble starts when we begin to consider what
Jaegwon Kim has called refloave downward causattcm (Kim 1999, 25)
Kim has claimed that this kind of causal power is conceptually in-
coherent and if he's nght, then emergence can be chsmissed While
it may be possible to fmd a vanety of apparent examples of refle»
ive downward causanon m nature, tias is not my purpose here, nor
would it settle the metaphysical question entrely Instead, my goal
is to overcome the conceptual or metaphysical obstacles that Kim
articulates on, more or less, their own terms
The contemporary debate concemmg the metaphysical status of
higher-level phenomena treats causanon and causal powers in terms
of the relationship between propernes These propemes are situated
withm a world of distmct layers or leveis It is common, for mstance,
to speak of higher- and lower-level propemes Ordmanly, these leveis
or layers are stacked m terms of their putative fundamentahty Our
basic physics fornis the ontological ground floor, with chemistry, biol-
ogy, psychology etc , each m tum providmg the higher layers While
there may be reasons for doubtmg its legitunacy, the layered picture
of the natural world is widely accepted by both reductionists and non-
reductive matenahsts
Within this layered world, propernes can cause mstannations of
other propemes m three ways They can cause instannations of prop-
entes at the same levei, at higher leveis or at lower leveis Exam-
ples of causal relattons between propernes at the same levei are easy
to imagine Likewtse for upward causation In the case of upward
causal relations, for example, we can imagine a property at a cer-
tam levei, say the molecular bonds m a crystal, causmg the crystal
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to be transparent Transparency is not a property of molecules, but
can mstead be thought of as a lugher-level property of ensembles of
molecules Upward causanon is central to traditional reductiorust ar-
guments concemmg the status of higher-level phenomena The heat
of a gas, a reducttorust will say, is caused by the kmenc action of its
constituents
Dovmward causation is a little trickier wahm the layered picture
of propemes Kun (1999) descnbes three approaches to downward
causation, supervement (or conceptual) downward causation, reflex-
rve downward causanon, (the kmd wluch he regards as both essen-
nal to emergenttsm and absurd) and a third kmd, wluch he regards
as unproblemanc, stemming simply from the addinve propernes of
ensembles Of this third kmd he wntes for example
[C]ases In which lugher-level entales and that- propernes prima fa-
cie causally tnfluence lower-level entales and that propemes seem
legion The celadon vase on my desk has a mass of 1 Inlogram If
it is dropped out the wmdow of my second floor ()fixe, it wdl crash
on the paved sulewalk, causmg mynads of molecules of ali sorts to
viole ntly fly away m every whtch direcnon Even before a has the
ground, it mil cut a rapid downward swath, causmg ali sorts of dts-
turbance among the local air molecules There is no quesnon that
the vase, in virtue of having this mass, has a sei of causal powers that
none das micro-constauents have (Kun 1999, 25-6)
The possession of this new set of powers by the vase does not
make the vase real, m the sense that emergennsts have traditionally
sought, because bemg 1 ktlogram is not a untquely vase-hke property
li is not 1 kilogram by virtue of bemg a vase as opposed to something
else Adchnve properttes are the ktnd of unsurpnsing consequences
of property changes that are equivalent to simply addmg constauents
together OT taking tilem away 1 know that if I keep piling firewood m
the dnveway it will eventually add up to a ton
Whde addmve propernes like mass and volume are relattvely con-
sistent with a reductiontst framework, most of our lugher-level gener-
alizations are prima facie irreducible In recent years, talk of econo-
mies, ecosystems, minds and the hke has been reconciled with ma-
tenaltsm via some form of functionaltsm Supervement concepttons
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of downward causanon, m particular are an attempt to make sense
of the importance of higher-level causal statements without violating
the causal closure pnnciple Advocates of superveraence handle the
problem of downward causation along the followmg lmes If one ac-
cepts that mtralevel causal relanons occur at a levei above that of our
most basic physics, then given strong superventence, all such descnp-
tions, mvolve the basal conditions from which the caused property
emerges or results So, to accept the truth of causal statements other
than those we find in our subatonuc physics is to accept downward
causation To say that A causes B, then I'm saymg that A causes the
basal conditions of B call them b(B) to be realized Of course A only
accomplishes this via its basal conditions, a(A)
The thrust of Kim's discussion of Mis kmd of downward causa-
non, is that ali lugher-level propernes are what they are by virtue of
their supervemence on certam lower-level propemes Only m so far
as this is true can we make sense of the chim that the higher-level
property A can be said to cause the instannatton of the lower-level
property b(B) Nevertheless, from an emergennst perspective, such
claras of downward causal power are empty smce the real agent ia
the event that gave nse to b(B) was the lower-level basal condition of
A namely a(A) Hence, on Kirn's view, lugher-level properties can
serve as causes ia downward casual relations only if they are reducible
to lower-level propemes" (1999, 33)
Kim's treatment of downward causation via the supervemence re -
lation imphes that when push comes to shove, we shall deny that
there really are any causal relations above the `very bottom levei'
Such fundamentalism comes at a high pnce, smce it dentes legaimacy
to sctentific generalizations above the levei of our basic physics On
this view, not only are minds causally tmpotent, but btological prop-
emes have no mfluence on chermcal events, chemical events cannot
mfluence physical events etc Insofar as the lugher-level sciences
succeed at ali, then genume suentific predictions are parasitic on the
causal activity of the basic physical constauents
In order to block any robust form of emergence, Kun tackles re-
flexive downward causation This is a third land of downward cau-
sation which Kim rules out as patently absurd For emergentists, Mis
paradoxical form of downward causation goes to the heart of what
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distinguishes the emergent phenomenon from its constauents Here,
the higher-level phenomenon acts on as own constauents Kun ar-
gues that das is an impossibly circular phenomenon ume, if cau-
sation is transinve, it seems to lead to a kmd of self-causation Kim
argues that the kind of self-causanon or self-determination that is re-
quired for emergence to make sense is "an apparent absurdity" (1999,
28) His argument takes two cases where a whole and its parts are
In a causal relation He considers first, the case where the part and
whole are m an mstantaneous causal relationship
Case 1
At a certam time t, a whole, W, has emergent property M where
M emerges from the followtng configuratton of conchttons W has
a complete decomposition mio parts a i (4, each has Property P„
and relation R holds for the sequence a i ar, For some a3 , W's
havmg M at t causes a, to have p, ai t (Kim 1999, 29)
He calls this a case of "synchroruc refleuve downward causation" and
sees it as unacceptably circular by virtue of the assumpnon that for
an entity to be responsible for an act, it must have had the power to
perform the act prior to performmg it He wraes
we said that the whole, W causes one of as proper parts, a) , to "have"
P If there is real downward causation, from W's havmg M to al's
having P, das "havmg" must be understood as "acquirmg" For if a)
already has PI at t, what role can W's havmg M at t play m causmg
a to have P t7 Obviously none (Kim 1999, 29)
The synchronic version of refiexive downward causation as charac-
tenzed by Kim looks hke an impossible kmd of bootstrapping effort
Gtven the framework presented here, causation takes place over time
and mvolves property changes that make "self-causing" unacceptably
paradoxical Howeve4 since most ordmary cases of downward cau-
sation do not leave the whole unchanged as it apparently acts on
its parts, emergentists mtght consider the synchromc case excessively
artificial The synchroruc case is, perhaps tailor-made for generating
the kind of paradox that serves his argument In order to block this
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une of objection, he moves on to constder the diachronic case, where
the relationship between parts and whole takes place over time
Case 2
As before W has emergent property M at t, and a, has P1 at t We
now constder the causal effect of Ws havmg M at t on al at a later
ame t At Suppose, then, that W's having M at t causes al to have
Q at t+ At (Kim 1999, 29)
In the diachromc case, the vicious circulanty has been removed, but
at the expense of the refiexive aspect of the relationslup that emer-
gentists hope to retam Cases of Mis type end up reducmg easily
to the kmd of supervement downward causal relationslup descnbed
above W's havmg M at t causes al to have Q at t +At But since aj's
havmg Q at t+ At is not part of the conditions that give nse to the
Property M, (smce those condttions obtamed at another time t) we
find no problem of bootstrappmg or self-causation Since these are
different basal conditions, the situation reduces to the supervement
downward causanon case discussed above
If Kun is correct, then there seems to be httle chance for the kind
of synchromc emergence that emergennsts require While it remams
possible to demonstrate that when somethmg emerges, it has an iden-
tifiable causal effect on the lower-level stuff from whtch it emerged
and that this effect is more than merely an adchnve consequence
(to use the old emergennst phrase) of the interaction of lower levei
constauents, ti= diachronic forrn of emergence is reducible to a sig-
ruficantly less exating kmd of supervement downward causation In
the diachroruc case since aj 's havtng Q at t + At is not part of the
conditions that give nse to the Property M, and therefore it does
not exhibit the problem of self-causanon or self-reference Whde
the diachroruc case will meet with few objections, the real pnze
the synchromc case Argumg for a robust form of emergentism re-
qutres that we demonstrate the signuficance of relations to the causal
powers of a system This, in turn must be done m such a way as
to show that emergent propemes have causal powers that are due
to the structural relanons between parts and not to the parts them-
selves As Kim's analysis makes clear, the only way to do so m a way
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that avoids reducmg the power of emergent propernes to those of
their constituents is via the synchrornc case So, can we imagine a
non-contradictory synchronic connection between the causal behav-
ior of parts and the emergent propemes of the wholes to which those
parts betone
We can begm by locatmg causal agency at the levei of the com-
ponents of structures ai an m precisely the way that Kim implicitly
does However, let's make a concession to contemporary physics by
mterpretmg causahty m terras of probability Smce probability and
structure are related notions, it is reasonable to assume that given
changes in the propernes M of a whole, W, we can expect the causal
powers or dispositions of the components of a system to change So
far, nothing prevents us from readmg this kind of causal relation-
ship between M and the causal powers of the constituents as a rei-
anvely bemgn form of Case 2 As such, it is perfectly acceptable to
see changes the property M as havmg a diachronic downward causal
relation with ai an as its constituents However, the diference be -
tween Kim's case and the case where we begm to interpret causality
in probabilistic terms is that once cause is mterpreted m terms of ob-
jective probabilities, the structure of the whole can be seen as playmg
a role m shapmg the causal powers of the constnuents So, whereas
Kim's example, the power of the property of the whole is the product
of the mterplay of the powers of its constituents, m the probabths-
tic context, by contrast, the structure can be imagmed as havmg an
effeet on its constnuents which is distmct from the powers of those
same constituents
To visualize the mfluence of an emergent property (admittedly a
sunple structural propetty) of a whole on its components consider
the followmg example In the old days at Harvard Law School, the
dean would begm the year by telhng the assembled first-years to look
to their left, then look to Meu- nght "By the end of the year" he
would say, "one of you will not be here" Obviously what he meant
to say was that there was a one-thnd attntion rate dunng the first
year at Harvard Law School If, as one would assume, it was a par-
ticularly graphic way of pomtmg out that roughly 1 out of 3 people
on average (or 33% of the entermg class) drop out, then as one can
easily see, a literal interpretation of lus mstructions to the assembled
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students would be n-usleadmg For mstance, lus mstructions would
have had the uruntended effect of makmg it more hkely that the stu-
dents sitting at the ends of the rows would leave law school than their
neighbors
On the other hand, if somehow the seating arrangement at the
occasion of the dean's statement, is relevant to the "1 out of 3" con-
clusion, then we could assume that his pronouncements must be
taken senously and that a change in the structural arrangement of
constituents could also be relevant Of course, the way the dean's
warmng was framed leads, if read literally, to something other than
what he intended But lees forget the dean's mtention for the time
being and focus instead on the law he stated For the sake of our
example, lees assume that he is more than a mere dean whose words
do not always reflect his intentions Lees assume mstead that he is
a god issumg commands to the constituents of the natural world at
the begmnmg of time His statement will now play proxy for a law
of nature Now, lees look at the implications of the law What is
the relationslup between a studenes chances of graduatmg, and his
location in a structure ? Obviously if the students are seated m a row,
the students at the end of the rows have a worse chance of makmg it
through school than the!" colleagues So, would a studenes chances
be hurt or helped, for example, by their standmg In a urde Obvi-
ously, her chances would be hurt
An informal proof for this obvious pomt goes like this Take the
dean's law to define a simple machme with three components, two
flankers and a central head turner Each component has the property
of being a head tumer if flanked on both sides (This latter condition
can be considered one of the lower-level propernes of our system)
a b c	 7
* * * ...> *
Every completed look to the left and nght picks one of the three, but
we cannot predict m advance which of the three is picked At this
stage we could say that each member has a 33 1/3 % chance of bemg
the one picked









It appears that their chance of bemg picked, given the rule above, has
mcreased to 50% simply by virtue of the structural or spanal relatton
This is because m the case of the lowest possible number of com-
ponents picked, say for example
1 (a's head turn) picks, say a
2 (b's head turn) picks, say a
3 (d's head turn) picks, say a
c cannot pick a, by vtrtue of the structural relanon, it must
pick either d, c or b
Under any circumstance, the lowest possible number of elements
ptcked is 2, therefore the chances of each component gettmg picked
has gone up to at least 50% So, it looks as if the structure makes a
significant chfference to the future of the components This exam-
ple may seem pretty contnved, smce it relies on the specification of
a peculiar law of nature that already mcludes some consideration of
structure However, if we admit that there is a relationship between
structure and probability and if we mterpret causahty m probabilistic
terrns, then it's reasonable to assume that structure makes a differ-
ence m the fate or causal power of constituents
Despite the extreme sunplicity and artificiahty of the law school
example, it serves as a way to highhght the effects of structural ar-
rangements on the causal power of systems and their constituents
Constramts, or laws, that govem the basic constttuents of the nat-
ural world, or m our scenano, mies estabhshed by the by the imag-
mary lawgiver m one particular structural context can give rase to
unexpected phenomena m another unanticipated structural context
Given the charactenzanon of causahty and probability assumed here
(and commonly accepted m physics) the behavtor of the compo-
nents of these new structures can be understood as altered or perhaps
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more colorfully as enslaved by their partiapation m these new struc-
tures Given some relattvely innocuous assumptions we can dann
that emergent properties can be both contmgent with respect to the
basic laws that determmed the behavior of the components m iso-
lanon, and can have an important consequence for the behavior of
those components
Returning to the issue of synchronic as opposed to chachromc
downward causation, Kim's point was that synchromc downward
causarton is mcoherent, whereas chachronic causation is reducible to
supervement or conceptual downward causation The pnncipal di-
ference between the scenario discussed here and Kim's treatment of
the issue is the probabffistic mterpretation of causahty Given the as-
sumption that structure and probabffity are related notions, we can
inter that the emergent property that we Identity with the whole has
an effect on the behavior of its parts But is this a chachromc prop-
erty, or can we say that the structure qua emergent property has the
lcmd of power that can act mstantaneously on its constituents7
On the one hand it is important to note that even given a de-
termunstic interpretation of causality, the structural property of the
whole can be seen as playmg a role in determirung the fates of its
constnuents However, as Kim showed, there is no way to develop a
synchromc account of this determination and it remams little more
than an amfact of our representational system By contrast, I dam, a
probabffistic mterpretation of causation can suffice to give us a mean-
mgful sense m wluch a whole can act on its parts without becoming
something other than itself In the process
To understand how, it is important that we first distmguish be-
tween what the emergent property of the whole is, what it's consti-
tuted by, and what the properties of the constituents are Here, I am
identifying the relevant emergent property of the whole as the struc-
ture that happens to be instantiated by these constituents 7 Given
that the property of the whole will change dependmg on how many
of the constituents drop out of the system the causal action of the
putative emergent property nught look like an example of diachronic
downward causation as m Case 2 However, the fundamental difer-
ence here is that the properties of the parts that are bemg affected
at t are not constnutive of the whole at time t The properties of
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the constituents have changed, however the change Is a change m
the probabihty that at the next head-turn they will be selected The
agency of the emergent property at the moment before the head-turn
is not changing the structure that we have identified as constitutwe
of that same emergent property In our case, the structural property
exerts a change on the causal power of the parts, but a funny kmd of
change, namely a change m their potential for behavior ui the mo-
ment immediately followmg their entry mto the whole As such, this
case does not reduce to the kmd of absurdity Kirn detects in Case 1
above
III
This paper supplements the sophistwated treatment of synchromc
and diachronic emergence that Alex Rueger provides m his analy-
sis of novel and irreducible structural propernes m physics (Rueger
2000) However, while Rueger and others are waty of ascribing novel
causal powers to emergent features of the natural world, the present
paper provides a relatwely simple way to understand such causal pow-
ers The alternative discussed here rases far more questions than it
answers, however, it provides a model for sansfying the demand for
the kmd of synchromc downward causation that emergentists seek
without fallmg prey to the bootstrappmg objections that plague ro-
bust forms of emergennsm 8
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Notes
Contemporary philosophers are wary of emergence because of the failing,s
of Bntish Emergentism This was a philosophical and scientific movement
that fell uno disrepute after a bnef penod of prommence in the first half of
the twenneth century In its early incamation, emergentism, was a robustly
metaphysical blend of direct reahsm, holism in biology and a blatantly pro-
gressivist mterpretation of evolunon The metaphysical views of the most
important figures m this tradition, Samuel Alexanden C D Broad, and A O
Lovejoy are rarely studied with any senousness today This neglect is due,
Iri part, to then speculative extremes but more importantly to then attitude
toward explanation So, for example, Alexander and Morgan urged readers
to accept emergent phenomena with 'natural piety' rather than seeking an
explanation
2 See for example, Block (1980)
3 Some modern advocates of emergence ciam not to require a synchromc
form of downward causatton, bui I would argue that without this, their view
reduces to a version of supervernence
202	 John Symons
4 In the case of the interactions between products of fusion and ther con-
stituents, we see for example, in the P-P chain, two pairs of protons fuse,
forming two deuterons Each deuteron fuses with an additional proton
to form hehum-3 The two hehum-3 nuclei whtch then fuse to create
berylhum-6, which is unstable and dismtegrates mto two protons plus a
hehum-4 In addition, the process releases two neutnnos, two positrons,
and gamma rays The posttrons anrululate quickly with electrons ia the
plasma, releasing additional energy In the form of gamma rays (See Harms
et ai 2000)
5 The actual nuclear fuston reactton takes place when nvo nuclet approach
within about 1 0E-15 m, so that the attractton, via the residual strong
teracnon between the nucle, overcomes the electncal repulsion between
the protons Such dose encounters only occur when nuclet colide with
sufficient kmetic energy Only at hzgh temperatures do enough energenc
ponteies exist for a decent number of fusion reactions to take place (See
Harms et ai 2000)
6 On emergent explanattons m physics see Rueger (2000)
7 Of course, the whole wili have a vanety of propernes that have nothmg to
do with the downward causal power of the system
8 This work was supported m part by a grant from the Utuversity Research
Institute of the Umversity of Texas at El Paso
